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In 1980, the City of Oakland, California ("Oakland"), began litiga-
tion which was both novel and thought provoking: the attempted con-
demnation of the Oakland Raiders professional football team
("Raiders"). With the October 1988 settlement of the Raiders' damage
claims, precipitated by Oakland's abortive condemnation, the fall-out
from this litigation has apparently come to a close,' nearly nine years
after it began. The enormity of the settlement amount raises questions
about the propriety of the unsuccessful condemnation and the reliability
of the dormant commerce clause defense.
This casenote provides an overview of "this seemingly endless cycle
of litigation,"2 focusing on the court of appeal's convoluted legal theory.
The.court's theory arose from a failure to focus on the case's legitimate
challenges under California condemnation law, and the finding of a tenu-
ous "conflict" between the dormant commerce clause and the eminent
domain power.' Moreover, this casenote supports the proposition that,
in the context of this eminent domain action, the commerce clause is not
a legitimate limitation on a municipality's power of condemnation.
II. BACKGROUND
This case's foundation was laid upon the creation of the Oakland
Raiders' American Football League ("AFL") franchise in 1959. 4 At that
time, no football stadium existed in Oakland so the earliest games were
1. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 13, 1988, Part I, at 24, col. 1 (reporting a settlement agree-
ment between the City of Oakland and the Los Angeles Raiders for 4 million dollars, plus 3.2
million dollars paid to Raider attorneys for their services); see also JusT COMPENSATION, Vol.
32, No. 12, Dec. 1988, at 3.
2. City of Oakland v. Los Angeles Raiders, 203 Cal. App. 3d 78, 81, 249 Cal. Rptr. 606,
608 (1988).
3. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
4. The facts surrounding the case are summarized from the Intended Decision of Supe-
rior Court Judge Nat A. Agliano, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044 at 2-11 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed July 22, 1983) (hereinafter "Intended Decision," unless otherwise noted).
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
played in San Francisco's Candlestick Park. Wins were few and far be-
tween and the spectator turn-out was low.
Oakland constructed Frank Youell Field in response to the Raiders'
owners' announcement that they intended to move or sell the franchise
unless Oakland provided a suitable playing field on San Francisco Bay's
east shore.' This 20,000 seat stadium became the site of Raiders' home
games until 1966. In 1963, Al Davis ("Davis") joined the club as head
coach. As a result, the Raiders experienced one of the most successful
eras known in professional sports.
6
The Raiders' success provided the impetus for construction of a ma-
jor sports and civic complex in Oakland, including the Oakland-Alameda
Coliseum ("Coliseum"), which was home for both a major league base-
ball team and the Raiders.7 The coliseum complex included an indoor
arena and an exhibition hall.
Oakland and Alameda County ("County") formed the non-profit,
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Commission ("OACC") to oversee
the Coliseum construction and operation, which was built on land owned
by both Oakland and the County.' The Raiders insisted that the OACC
change the original two-tiered stadium plan to a three-tiered plan.9 This
new design proved to be costly, time-consuming and created conflicts
during seasonal overlaps for the football and baseball games.10
Raiders' home games were sold out every year to season ticket hold-
ers from 1968 through 1979.11 The team's success and the expense of
player salaries sent ticket prices soaring. Nevertheless, due to the Coli-
seum's seating limitations, the demand for tickets could not be met. A
waiting list of 8,000 to 10,000 potential buyers developed. 2 The Coli-
seum remained the Raiders' home from 1966 until the club moved to Los
Angeles in 1982.
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3.
8. In 1964, funding for the complex was acquired through the proceeds of a $25,500,000
(4.125%) bond issue, fully maturing in 2004, with an annual pay down rate of $1,350,000.
Cost of the complex construction was $27,000,000. Intended Decision, supra note 4, at 3-4.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. Because of special contractual rules in the lease agreements between the Raiders
and the OACC and the Oakland Athletics baseball franchise and the OACC, football games
could not be played within 36 hours of baseball games. This created scheduling conflicts be-
tween the two sports. For example, when the Athletics finished a game on Saturday, the
Raiders could not play a game on Sunday without violating their contract with the OACC.
Thus, many of the Raiders' home games were played in the stadium at University of California
at Berkeley. Id. at 6.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Intended Decision, supra note 4, at 5-6.
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In 1966, the Raiders and the OACC entered into a five-year percent-
age lease agreement 13 with five three-year renewal options. The OACC
agreed to these lease terms because of the AFL's strength and the Raid-
ers' owners' desire to keep the club in Oakland, provided it was success-
ful.' 4 The Raiders also negotiated a release agreement from the first five-
year term, exercisable only if the National Football League ("NFL") re-
quired the club to relocate after the AFL/NFL merger in 1966. The
Raiders, however, were not required to move. 5
In subsequent years, the relationship between the Raiders and the
OACC became strained. First, the lease terms gave baseball priority over
football.' 6 Second, the Coliseum's locker rooms, scoreboards, sound sys-
tems and inadequate seating became additional sources of dispute. The
Raiders and the OACC offered various settlement proposals. '" However,
no agreement was reached.' 8 Finally, the Raiders demanded construc-
tion of luxury seating boxes.19
Although the OACC agreed to the luxury boxes in principle, it
would not underwrite the project unless the Raiders guaranteed the pro-
ject construction loans and signed a long-term lease. 20 However, the
Raiders refused to guarantee a loan on property owned by Oakland and
shared with other sport clubs.21 Unable to reach an agreement, the Raid-
ers allowed the original lease to expire.22
In 1978, the Los Angeles Rams decided to move from the Los An-
geles Memorial Coliseum to Anaheim Stadium in Orange County. The
Los Angeles Coliseum Commission ("LACC") solicited other NFL
teams with expiring leases to play in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
beginning in 1980.23 The LACC negotiated with the Raiders through
1979 and into 1980.24 However, the Raiders' prospective move was ham-
13. As part of the lease agreement between the OACC and the Raiders, rent of the Coli-
seum was in part calculated on a percentage of the gross ticket sales to the Raiders' home
games. Id. at 4.
14. Id.
15. The NFL allowed the Raiders to remain in Oakland upon the express condition that
they pay substantial consideration to the San Francisco 49'ers. Only two teams were required
to pay such consideration for territorial infringement after the AFL/NFL merger, the other
being the New York Jets to the New York Giants. Id. at 5.
16. Id.




21. Intended Decision, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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pered when the NFL announced plans to block the move under Rule 4.3
of the NFL constitution.25 Rule 4.3 requires that two-thirds of the NFL
membership must approve of any franchise move.26 This announcement
prompted the LACC to challenge rule 4.3's validity in federal court.27
However, the challenge was dismissed due to the LACC's lack of
standing.28
On January 9, 1980, the Raiders rejected the OACC's new licensing
and lease agreement for unspecified reasons.29 Thereafter, a task force
consisting of members of the Oakland City Council, the County, the
OACC and private industry was created to negotiate a new lease with the
Raiders.30 On January 19, 1980, the task force presented Davis with a
new proposal, including a $4,000,000 loan for construction of luxury
boxes. 31 Although Davis characterized this offer as "the first reasonable
one he had seen," he turned it down as insufficient.
32
On January 22, 1980, Davis received a revised proposal from the
task force.33 However, Davis made the additional demand that the
OACC, Oakland and the County pay the Raiders' territorial infringe-
ment indemnity to the San Francisco 49'ers,34 amounting to a $1,000,000
rent credit spread over the lease term.35 Davis also demanded an addi-
tional $1,000,000 in construction loan financing. 36 The parties agreed in
principle.3 7 The Mayor of Oakland was satisfied that the new terms were
necessary "considering the importance of keeping the Raiders in Oak-
land."' 38 During these negotiations, the NFL Commissioner's office in-
formed a member of the task force that the NFL would oppose the
Raiders' move to Los Angeles.39
On January 28, 1980, the Raiders and the task force met again to
finalize the revised proposal, but a meeting of the minds did not occur for
25. Id.
26. Intended Decision, supra note 4, at 7.
27. Id
28. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).
29. Intended Decision supra note 4, at 7.




34. See supra note 15.




39. Id at 8-9.
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disputed reasons." Oakland argued that the Raiders had again submit-
ted new and additional demands which were unacceptable.4" The Raid-
ers argued the task force reneged on the agreed terms.42
On February 1, 1980, the County's Board of Supervisors revoked
the negotiation authority of the task force without explanation.43 On
February 4, 1980, the OACC presented another proposal to the Raid-
ers." The Raiders refused the proposal because it reiterated certain de-
mands which the Raiders previously found unacceptable.45  Each side
charged the other with bad faith in the negotiations." The Raiders, con-
cluding that no other alternative existed, resolved to move to Los
Angeles.47
Oakland moved quickly. On February 22, 1980, Oakland filed an
eminent domain action to acquire all of the Raiders' franchise rights re-
lated to the NFL Franchise Certificate of Membership. 4 This certificate
signified the right to operate a professional NFL football club in Oak-
land.49 Additionally, Oakland alleged that the property condemned con-
sisted of all the Raiders' rights in football player contracts which were
associated with the operation of the Raiders' franchise.'0
Concurrently with filing the condemnation action, Oakland ac-
quired a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Raiders from leav-
ing Oakland.51 On April 17, 1980, the trial court granted a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the Raiders' move to Los Angeles, based upon a





45. Intended Decision, supra note 4, at 9.
46. Id
47. Id.
48. Id at 10-11.
49. Id at 11.
50. The actual resolution of necessity described the property to be condemned as:
All of those rights associated with, incidental to, deriving from, or related to the
Franchise Certificate of Membership issued by the National Football League and
signifying the rights associated with permission to operate a National Football
League professional football club franchise in Oakland, California; in addition
thereto, said property consists of all rights and privileges of Oakland Raiders, Ltd.,
relating to football player contracts, agreements, options or other contractual or
quasi-contractual matters associated with the operation of said football club
franchise.
Trial Brief of Plaintiff at 3, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044 (Cal. Super. Ct.),
aff'd, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
51. Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d
414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985) (No. A029031), cert denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
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showing of irreparable harm to Oakland if the franchise relocated.52
Oakland then proposed and passed a resolution of public necessity, 53 for-
mally condemning the Raiders' franchise rights. On June 16, 1980, the
trial court granted summary judgment against Oakland. 54 The trial
court ruled that the franchise could not be condemned because intangible
property could not be condemned as a matter of law.55 In 1982, this
judgment was reversed by the California Supreme Court ("Raiders I,).56
The Raiders I court found, among other things, that intangible property
was subject to condemnation like any other property, and remanded the
case for trial.57 The California Supreme Court vacated a court of ap-
peal's decision affirming the trial court's decision. 58
Upon remand, the trial court denied Oakland's application for an
order reinstating the preliminary injunction.59 Oakland then sought a
writ of mandate from the court of appeal.' The court of appeal issued a
peremptory writ of mandate, directing the trial court to conduct a hear-
ing on Oakland's application to reinstate the preliminary injunction
("Raiders H"11). 6 ' Nevertheless, the Raiders moved to Los Angeles and
began playing their home games at the Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum.62
Following the regular 1982 football season, the trial court reinstated
the injunction against the franchise's relocation.63 The trial court then
held a hearing to determine Oakland's right to condemn the Raiders. 
6
On July 22, 1983, the trial court ruled that Oakland was not entitled to
condemn intangible franchise rights.65 Oakland petitioned the California
Supreme Court for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to compel vaca-
52. Id.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 182-196.
54. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 51, at 2.
55. Id.
56. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673
(1982) ("Raiders I).
57. Id.
58. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646,
superseded by Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
59. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 51, at 2.
60. Id.
61. City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 565, 186 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1982)
("Raiders 11"). This ruling was an astonishing disposition because the trial court had only
declined to reinstate the injunction in a summary, ex parte proceeding. Further, the trial court
invited Oakland to present its request again in a proper application, determined in a properly
noticed hearing.
62. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 51, at 2.
63. Id. at 2-3.
64. Id. at 3.
65. See Intended Decision, supra note 4.
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tion of the trial court's decision.66 Oakland's petition was transferred to
the court of appeal.67 On December 29, 1983, the court of appeal or-
dered the trial court to vacate its judgment because it had not acted in
conformity with prior appellate opinions in the case ("Raiders III" ).68
The trial court then conducted additional proceedings in accordance
with the appellate court's mandate and again entered judgment in favor
of the Raiders on August 10, 1984.69 On appeal, the trial court's order
was affirmed ("Raiders IV").7 The court of appeals' decision is the sub-
ject of this note.
III. THE PROPRIETY OF THE CONDEMNATION ACTION
The trial court originally dismissed Oakland's condemnation action
because it concluded that intangible property rights were not "property"
which a municipality could acquire through eminent domain.7 The Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal initially upheld the trial court's judgment.72 The
California Supreme Court eventually overturned the judgment in Raiders
L73
Before examining the Raiders IV court's application of the dormant
commerce clause, it is important to note that the power of eminent do-
main does extend to intangible property rights, such as franchise rights.
Accordingly, the following is offered to underscore the ability of the gov-
ernment to condemn intangible property.
A. Over a Century of Intangible Property Condemnations
As early as 1848, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether intangible property rights could be taken through the power of
eminent domain. In West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,74 the Court upheld a
Vermont Supreme Court decision that a toll bridge, along with the real
estate and franchise/contractual rights of the West River Bridge Corpo-
ration, could be taken for public use.75
66. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 51, at 3.
67. Id.
68. City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983)
("Raiders III").
69. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 51, at 4.
70. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986) ("Raiders IV").
71. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 63, 646 P.2d at 836, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (1982).
72. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders Ltd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 422, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646,
superseded by Raiders I 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
73. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
74. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
75. Id. at 530, 536.
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The Court found that every contract is subject to certain natural
laws that are superior to the contract itself. The parties' communal so-
cial expectations make these natural laws conditions upon every con-
tract's terms.76 The government's power to take property for public use,
through the natural law of eminent domain, is one of those superimposed
conditions to which all other laws and contracts are subject." The Court
also found that a franchise was a type of property which had no inherent
characteristics to differentiate it from other types of property subject to
eminent domain.78
Allowing the condemnation of intangible property has remained
valid law ever since West River Bridge. 9 The government's ability to
take intangible property exists as readily as its ability to condemn land or
other tangible property.80 For example, in Kimball Laundry Co. v.
United States,8' a laundry was condemned for the United States mili-
tary's use during World War II. The laundry had to suspend service to
its regular customers during this period, losing considerable business
goodwill.8 2 In the compensation proceedings, the district court disal-
lowed any evidence showing diminution of the value of the ongoing busi-
ness due to the loss of business goodwill.83 The Eighth Circuit Court of
76. Id. at 532.
77. Id
78. Id. at 534.
79. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); Raiders 1, 32 Cal.
3d at 63, 646 P.2d at 836, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (1982). In actions for inverse condemnation,
supporting the principle that franchise or contractual rights are subject to condemnation, and
therefore are compensable when taken by the government or its authorized agents, see Monon-
gahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (franchise rights to collect tolls
from a dam and lock network are protected by just compensation); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (Mechanic's liens on materials used in ships sold to the United
States government were not subject to the principle of sovereign immunity since the United
States did not have title to the vessels when the liens became effective. Therefore, the liens
were compensible when they were extinguished following the United States' final acquisition of
the ships.); Sutfin v. State of California, 261 Cal. App. 2d 50, 67 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1968) (action
in inverse condemnation is allowable for personal as well as real property).
80. See, e.g., 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 2.1[2], at 2-8 to 2-9 (3d ed. 1980) ("In-
tangible property, such as... franchises, charters or any other form of contract... [is] within
the scope of [the eminent domain power] as fully as land .. ") (emphasis added); 29A C.J.S.
Eminent Domain § 108 (1965) (compensation required for personal property taken, including
contract and contractual rights); see generally, Kanner, When is "Property" not "Property It-
self" 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 60, 64-70 (1970) (arguing that "in California, the goodwill of a busi-
ness meets each and every one of [the] criteria of 'property,'" and therefore, should be
compensated for when the government condemns the existing business).
81. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
82. Id. at 8.
83. The United States Supreme Court defined business goodwill in that case as the laun-
dry's continued hold on its customer's patronage. Id.
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Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling,84 finding that because the
government "did not ... intend to take" the company's business good-
will, its subsequent loss did not require just compensation.8
5
The United States Supreme Court reversed.86 Labeling the intangi-
ble business goodwill as a "going-concern value," 8 1 the Court reasoned
that because the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution re-
quires compensation for tangible property, intangible going-concerns
should also be compensable, if shown to be present and to have been
diminished by a taking of tangible property.8 8 The Court distinguished
those cases where the condemnor only takes the tangible property of the
business, but leaves the owner free to move his business enterprise to a
new location. 9 Under such circumstances, the owner is not entitled to
compensation for loss of business goodwill because the government has
not taken the business for proprietorship purposes. 9° The Court's rea-
soning necessitates the conclusion that, if intangible property is compen-
sable, then intangible property rights are condemnable.
B. The Raiders' Franchise is Also Property Subject to Condemnation
The Raiders' NFL franchise and contractual benefits cannot be
meaningfully distinguished from those rights deemed subject to the
power of eminent domain. Like the laundry's goodwill and West River
Bridge's contractual right to collect tolls, the Raiders' franchise rights
are a species of "property."9 A franchise is capable of being owned,
bought, sold, or condemned just as any other form of property.92
Franchises and contractual rights are included in California's broad defi-
nition of property as well.93 So long as California eminent domain law
requirements are adhered to, no reasonable basis exists for preventing the
condemnation of intangible property. The Raiders I court, in noting that
all real or personal property is primarily valued in relation to an intangi-
84. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 166 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1948), rev'd 338 U.S. 1
(1949).
85. Id. at 860.
86. Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
87. Id at 9.
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 80.
92. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.110 (Deering 1988), which provides that any prop-
erty or interest in property may be condemned "including, but not limited to... franchises to
collect tolls .... (emphasis added); see also supra note 80.
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.170 (Deering 1988), in pertinent part, defines 'prop-
erty' [as including] real and personal property and any interest therein." (emphasis added).
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ble property right, expressly found that California eminent domain law
allowed condemnation of the Raiders' franchise.94
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE DEFENSE
Because Raiders I conclusively established that Oakland's proposed
condemnation of the Raiders' franchise was a legitimate "public use"
under California's eminent domain law, the Raiders had to rely on other
arguments to prevent the condemnation. The argument that eventually
proved successful was that the condemnation violated the dormant com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution. This section summarizes
the dormant commerce clause and the Raiders IV court's treatment of
three Oakland defenses. It then comments on the propriety of these
arguments.
A. Overview of the "Dormant" Commerce Clause and the Limitations
on Trade and Commerce Between the States
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to regulate commerce among the several states.95 How-
ever, the Constitution does not expressly limit the extent to which the
states may regulate interstate commerce.96 Therefore, the Supreme
Court has taken upon itself determination of the extent to which a state
may regulate interstate commerce when Congress has remained silent in
the regulated area.97 This body of law has come to be known as the
dormant commerce clause.
The earliest commerce clause interpretations revealed the dormant
commerce clause's primary purpose: the abolition of trade wars among
the several states and establishment of cohesive national trade markets.
98
Congress' failure to regulate a given market forced the United States
Supreme Court to keep interstate commerce as free from state impedi-
ment as possible.
In the early dormant commerce clause cases, a distinction arose be-
tween state commerce regulations and the exercise of state police
power. 99 The Court invalidated or upheld most state regulations based
94. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 68, 646 P.2d at 840, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
96. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
97. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 6-2, at 403-04 (2d ed. 1988); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
98. L. TRIBE, supra note 97, at § 6-3.
99. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
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upon the categorization.' " Although these labels did not precisely de-
scribe the Court's dormant commerce clause analysis,' 0 ' the ability of a
state to pass valid regulations incidentally affecting interstate commerce
was impliedly established. A state regulation was upheld so long as its
effect upon interstate commerce was not the result of discrimination
against out-of-state commerce.
10 2
More recently, the Court established a balancing test, in which the
state regulation's achievement of a legitimate state interest is balanced
against its affect upon the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce.
10 3
Although some decisions have focused on "direct" or "indirect" effects,
the Court has settled on the principle that a state regulation affecting
interstate commerce will be upheld if the regulation is "rationally re-
lated" to a legitimate state interest and that interest outweighs any bur-
den on interstate commerce.'10 Moreover, the Court has upheld state
actions which incidentally burden interstate commerce, provided the
burden results from state participation in the effected market.
B. The Market Participant Doctrine
The market participant doctrine operates as an exception to the dor-
mant commerce clause, allowing states to enter various trade markets as
participants even though such participation affects interstate com-
merce.0 5 In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,' °6 the State of Maryland
offered a "bounty" to anyone who removed an abandoned vehicle from
Maryland highways."0 7 A citizen of Virginia challenged the program,
alleging that Maryland violated the dormant commerce clause by refus-
ing to pay for junk cars removed from Virginia highways. '0 The United
States Supreme Court upheld the practice, holding that Maryland had a
right to favor its own citizens over other states' citizens as a participant
in the junk car market."°9 Further, the market participant doctrine has
been used to uphold state restrictions on exclusive sales of state manufac-
100. L. TRIBE, supra note 97, at § 6-3.
101. Id.
102. See Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 257.
103. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
104. Id. at 770-71; L. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 408.
105. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 (1980); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204
(1983).
106. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
107. Id at 797.
108. Id. at 803.
109. Id. at 810.
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tured cement to that state's own citizens,110 and a city ordinance restrict-
ing awards of municipal construction contracts to companies which
employ a minimum percentage of that city's residents. 11
C. Raiders IV Court's Commerce Clause Reasoning
The Raiders IV court relied heavily on the trial court's characteriza-
tion of the NFL as a "joint venture, organized for the purpose of provid-
ing entertainment nationwide.""' 2 This characterization was important
to the Raiders IV court's opinion because the national structure of the
league made the interstate commerce analysis applicable.'
The court briefly reviewed the purpose of the dormant commerce
clause 1 4 and then relied on the approach' established in Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona." 6 Under Southern Pacific, a regulation will be
voided if it governs aspects of the national economy which require na-
tionally uniform regulation by a single authority." 7 Although sparingly
used,"' Southern Pacific served the Raiders IV court well, providing an
analogy to another NFL case decided on commerce clause grounds, Par-
tee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co. ' " The court briefly reviewed and
dismissed three Oakland arguments raised to preclude dormant com-
merce clause review, reaching Partee in the third argument.
1. Law of the Case Doctrine Dismissed
Oakland argued for an exemption from dormant commerce clause
review on three principles. The first was that Raiders I had bound all
subsequent proceedings in the case. Therefore, the law of the case doc-
trine precluded further review.' 20 In Oakland's view, the Raiders had
raised the dormant commerce clause defense in their unsuccessful peti-
110. Reeves. 447 U.S. 429.
111. White, 460 U.S. 204.
112. Raiders IV 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (1985).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 417, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55.
115. "[S]tate or local regulation of interstate commerce will be upheld if it 'regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental .. .unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to putative local benefits.'" Id. at 417-18, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155, quoting Edger v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982).
116. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
117. Id. at 767.
118. Raiders IV 174 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
119. 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983).
120. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
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tion for rehearing after RaidersI. L21 However, the Raiders IV court re-
jected the law of the case argument because the briefs in Raiders I did not
contain dormant commerce clause discussion.1 22 Furthermore, the Raid-
ers IV court ruled that denial of rehearing would not dispose of new and
unlitigated arguments. 23
2. Market Participant Argument Dismissed
Second, Oakland argued that it was exempt from dormant com-
merce clause review because Oakland was attempting to penetrate the
NFL market as a participant, not as a regulator. 12 4 The court conceded
that if Oakland did enter the market as a participant, the commerce
clause would not be applicable. 25 However, the court found that Oak-
land did not attempt to participate as an equal bidding competitor with
other potential market participants.126 Instead, Oakland used its govern-
mental status to take an NFL franchise.' 27 Therefore, the court held that
the market participant doctrine would not shield Oakland from dormant
commerce clause review when participation is obtained through
condemnation. 
28
3. Lack of Precedent Barring Condemnations is Irrelevant
Finally, Oakland argued that a condemnation cannot violate the
dormant commerce clause because no other court had so ruled. 29 The
court found this argument unpersuasive. The Raiders IV court dismissed
the apparent lack of case law as a "mere indication" of the traditional
limitation of eminent domain to real property, which does not implicate
commerce clause issues.' 30 Accordingly, the court found that condem-
nation of intangible property, the Raiders' franchise, was essentially a
question of first impression.
a13
The Raiders argued that since the NFL is a nationwide business,




124. Raiders IV 174 Cal. App. 3d at 418-19, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155.




129. Raiders IV 174 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57.
130. Id The court's conclusion here was simply inaccurate. See Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d 60,
646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982).
131. Id.
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burden interstate commerce. 32 The Raiders IV court, accepting the trial
court's findings that the NFL was a nation-wide joint venture, 33 found
that condemnation of the Raiders' franchise could force the team to re-
main in Oakland indefinitely. 134  Thus, the court reasoned that the
NFL's interest would become subordinate to Oakland's. 35 Analogizing
to Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co.,136 the Raiders IV court
flatly stated that this condemnation was the "precise brand of parochial
meddling with the national economy that the commerce clause was
designed to prohibit." '
37
The court found that Oakland did not seek to promote the health or
safety of its citizenry, but instead sought to promote the City's public
recreation, social relations and economic benefits.' 3 ' Thus, the burden
placed on interstate commerce by the condemnation greatly outweighed
any local benefit inuring to Oakland. 39 Therefore, the Raiders IV court
disallowed Oakland's attempted condemnation of the Raiders' franchise
on dormant commerce clause grounds alone."' °
D. Criticism of the Raiders IV Court's Analysis
In its briefs, Oakland gave only cursory coverage to the Raiders'
dormant commerce clause defense.' 4 ' Oakland recognized that several
other types of businesses had been previously condemned and operated
by the government without violating the dormant commerce clause.'
42
For example, no dormant commerce clause violation exists when a mu-
nicipality condemns and operates a subway running between two
132. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 419-20, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57.
133. Id. at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983), in which the California
Supreme Court held that California's antitrust laws would impermissibly burden interstate
commerce if they were applied to an NFL franchise.
137. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
138. Trial Brief of Plaintiff at 13, supra note 50.
139. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
140. Id.
141. See Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 28, supra note 50 and compare Trial Brief for Defendant
at 28-31, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044 (Cal. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 174 Cal.
App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985) (No. A02903 1), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986). See
also Appellant's Opening Brief at 33-37, supra note 51; Appellant's Reply Brief at 33-35, City
of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985) (No.
A02903 1), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986) and compare Respondent's Brief at 33-38, City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985) (No. A029031),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1007 (1986).
142. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 80, § 2.222, at 2-145.
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states,I43 or condemns an easement for public use across a railroad line as
authorized by Congress.'" Therefore, it would seem logical that the
condemnation of franchise rights in an active football team would not
run afoul of the dormant commerce clause. However, Raiders IV, if
nothing else, teaches one not to regard seemingly meritless defenses too
lightly. '45
Perhaps Oakland should not be judged too harshly. The California
Supreme Court did rule in Raiders I that the state eminent domain law
allows the condemnation of a sports franchise.'46 Moreover, Raiders I
expressly held that neither the state nor federal constitution prohibits
such a condemnation. 147 Upon remand from Raiders I, it would be logi-
cal to assume that no state trial court would find constitutional reasons
to block the condemnation.
It is difficult to understand how this condemnation would substan-
tially burden interstate commerce, simply because the Raiders' football
team could not afterward permanently play its home games in a location
other than Oakland. The NFL's regular game schedule would continue
unaltered. The Raiders IV court does not indicate how a change in the
Raiders' ownership would affect the NFL's "commerce" (football
games).
More particularly, it is unrealistic for the Raiders IV court to con-
clude that one condemnation of a sports franchise would lead to wide-
spread condemnations of sports franchises. 148  In most cases, the
financial impact of paying the required just compensation for a profes-
sional sports franchise would be astronomic. Moreover, such "protec-
tionist condemnations"' 149 are more appropriately prevented by state
legislatures. The state legislature could preclude business franchise con-
demnations altogether, or limit such condemnations to those businesses,
such as professional sports franchises, which provide unique benefits to
their communities but have relatively minor effects upon interstate com-
merce. 150 However, the Raiders IV court was not content with deferring
143. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Hudson R.T. Corp., 285 N.Y.S.2d 24, 231 N.E.2d
736 (1967).
144. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 80, § 2.222, at 2-145.
145. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
146. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 73, 646 P.2d at 843, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
147. Id.
148. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 421, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
149. Lazarus, The Commerce Clause Limitation on the Power to Condemn a Relocating
Business, 96 YALE L.J. 1343, 1352 (1987).
150. One of the concerns expressed by Mr. Lazarus in his article (see supra note 149) is that
just compensation will not adequately "remedy the defects of protectionist condemnations.
Contracts, franchise rights and licenses, necessary elements of protectionist takings, are unique
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to just compensation or legislative determination to hinder renegade mu-
nicipalities from condemning sports franchises en masse.
The Raiders IV court briefly dismissed all of Oakland's arguments
with rather perfunctory analysis. The court first dismissed Oakland's
contention that the entire suit was precluded by the "law of the case" as
decided in Raiders .1" Second, Oakland argued that it was exempt
from commerce clause preclusion because "it has merely attempted to
enter the market as a participant, not as a regulator."' 52 The court dis-
missed this issue on the grounds that the attempt was made by eminent
domain and not as an "equal participant."' 53 Whether a state needs to
enter into a market as an equal participant is open to dispute. Thus, the
Raiders IV court's analysis warrants brief comment.
commodities--not fungible with cash or replaceable at will." Id. at 1354. The quick answer is
that all property is in some aspect unique, and carried to its logical extreme, even routine
condemnations in some respects always impose dislocations and losses that are not "replacea-
ble at will" or "fungible with cash." See Molho and Kanner, Urban Renewal. Laissez-Faire for
the Poor, Welfare for the Rich, 8 PAc. L.J. 627 (1977).
But more importantly, the concept of just compensation is not concerned with the con-
demnee's ability to replace the taken property. Rather, just compensation is intended to com-
pensate the owner for the property taken. However, what often passes for just compensation
may lead one to the reasonable conclusion that it is neither "just" nor "compensation." See J.
GELIN AND D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.1, at 101-14 (1982)
and cited authorities; see generally Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Com-
pensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 765 (1976); Monongahela, 148 U.S. 312 (1892). This
"compensation" concept is consistent with the view that condemnation actions are against
property and not against the owner. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 80, § 1.142[1]; ("[J]ust compensa-
tion, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner.") Monongahela, 148 U.S. at
326; accord United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338 (1892); Duckett & Co. v. United States,
266 U.S. 149 (1924); West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (5 How.) 507 (1848); Ossining
Urban Renewal Agency v. Lord, 39 N.Y.2d 628, 350 N.E.2d 405 (1976); San Bernardino
Valley Mun. Water Dist. v. Gage Canal Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1964).
It is an unfortunate reality that the business owner, who becomes the victim of what amounts
to a governmental theft of his or her property, will not be fully compensated for resulting
business losses, but will probably be driven out of business entirely by the taking, all with the
courts' willing approval. While this rule is of dubious origins (see Risinger, Direct Damages:
The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises are Condemned 15
SETON HALL L. REV. 483 (1985)) and quite unjust (see Kanner, When is "Property" Not
"Property Itself" 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 60 (1970)), it is difficult to see why owners of football
franchises should be singled out as the only persons placed above the existing-albeit contro-
versial-rules of eminent domain law.
151. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56. The law of the case
doctrine was not strongly contested by Oakland, and therefore need not be discussed here.
152. Id. at 418-19, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
153. Id. at 419, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
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1. The Raiders IV Court's Market Participant
Analysis is Questionable
The court stated that Oakland "would escape commerce clause re-
view if it had in fact acted as a mere market participant .... 154 How-
ever, the court indicated that entrance into the market does not escape
commerce clause review when entrance is achieved through the sovereign
power of eminent domain. 55 As authority for this proposition, the
court, quoting from Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 56 stated that the "commerce
clause applies to 'actions taken by states in their sovereign capacity' but
does not limit proprietary activity."' 57 Unfortunately, this quotation was
taken out of context.
The Reeves Court actually stated: "[t]he commerce clause was di-
rected, as an historical matter, only at regulatory and taxing actions
taken by states in their sovereign capacity.' o58 The immediate context of
the entire quotation reveals the Raiders IV court's inappropriate use of
this language.
In Reeves, the state of South Dakota owned and operated a cement
manufacturing plant.' 59 A policy of the plant was to restrict sales of
cement to South Dakota citizens only."6° The United States Supreme
Court upheld the state policy, finding that because the State was acting as
a cement market participant and not as a regulator, it could restrict sales
of cement to South Dakota residents without violating the dormant com-
merce clause. 161
Oakland's condemnation could not be termed a regulation in the
same sense as South Dakota's policy to confine cement sales to state citi-
zens because the market for Raiders' NFL football games was not re-
stricted to Oakland residents alone. Whether Davis or Oakland owns the
team, the Raiders would still play their regular schedule of games ac-
cording to NFL procedures. In addition, any correlative rights which
the remaining NFL franchise owners might have in the Raiders'
franchise would not be diminished by the transfer of ownership from Da-
vis to Oakland. Such correlative rights should continue in full effect, just
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
157. Raiders IV 174 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
158. Reeves, 447 U.S. 429.
159. d at 430-31.
160. Id at 432-33.
161. Id. at 437.
1989]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
as if Davis had sold the Raiders' franchise to Oakland by negotiated
agreement.
Moreover, the Reeves Court upheld the state cement sales policy,
noting the general rule that "[n]othing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional ac-
tion, from participating in the market to favor its own citizens over
others."' 6 2 In no sense can Reeves be said to support the proposition that
Oakland may not enter the NFL franchise market through the power of
eminent domain, notwithstanding the fact that Reeves did not address
the issue of eminent domain.
Thus, the Raiders IV court had no reason to dismiss the market
participant argument. Oakland properly exercised its right to acquire the
Raiders' franchise by eminent domain. By the Raiders IV court's own
admission, Oakland was entitled to escape judicial review of the com-
merce clause regulation since it did enter the market as a participant and
not as a regulator.163 The court made no allegation that Oakland
planned to regulate the NFL in terms of ticket prices, or in any other
tangible manner. The court failed to indicate how or why the condemna-
tion of the Raiders' franchise would in anyway regulate interstate com-
merce. The court was merely concerned with maintaining the status
quoa 164
2. The Raiders IV Court's Reliance on Partee is Misplaced
Finally, in determining the case on commerce clause grounds, the
Raiders IV court relied on the trial court's findings in conjunction with
Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co.' 65 In Partee, a field-goal
kicker challenged the NFL's rules regarding free agency under California
antitrust laws. 1 66 The California Supreme Court ruled that state anti-
trust laws did not apply to the NFL because of the need for national
uniformity in league structure. 167 Finding the NFL to be organized on a
national scale, the court found that if each state's antitrust legislation
applied, the internal NFL structure would require compliance with the
most restrictive state's standard. 168  The resulting fragmentation of
162. Id at 436, quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
163. Raiders IV, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
164. Id at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
165. 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983).
166. Id. at 380-81, 668 P.2d at 676, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
167. Id. at 385, 668 P.2d at 679, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
168. Id at 383-84, 668 P.2d at 677-78, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71.
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league structure would adversely affect the NFL's competitive nature.' 6 9
Therefore, the court held that applying state antitrust legislation to the
NFL would impermissibly burden interstate commerce, since structural
league cohesiveness substantially outweighed the state's interest in regu-
lating the league.' 7 °
Partee affected the entire league structure. Applying state antitrust
laws to the NFL would have led to a different way of doing business for
all of the league's teams. Such is not the case with the Oakland condem-
nation. Oakland's condemnation would only result in a forced change in
the Raiders' ownership. A forced change in ownership would not change
the way the league did business nationally. In fact, NFL games would
continue without interruption and the NFL's internal structure would
not be seriously affected.
Moreover, the Raiders IV court's fear of interference with interstate
commerce is based on the speculation that allowing Oakland to condemn
the Raiders' franchise would set off rampant sport franchise condemna-
tions across the nation.' 7 ' This proposition cannot reasonably be com-
pared to subjecting the NFL, as a whole, to the requirements of
individual state antitrust legislation which would have an immediate im-
pact upon league contracts and structure.
Nevertheless, the Raiders IV court relied on the trial court's finding
that a nationwide league ownership structure was necessary to the
NFL.'72 The potential that Oakland could permanently indenture the
Raiders in the city was somehow so significant that it "would adverse[ly]
affect the League enterprise." '73 This conclusion is purely speculative.
The court's conclusion that the permanent indenture of a sports
franchise to a particular city would have adverse impact on the financial
success of the NFL as a whole is unsupported. Since Oakland's reasons
for condemning the Raiders are arguably legitimate,' 74 the condemna-
tion should not have been denied on dormant commerce clause grounds.
Condemnation was a rational method to protect Oakland's interest in
providing recreation to its citizens.' 75
What may have motivated the court was the possible impact upon
the bargaining strength of the NFL franchises with stadium owners if
169. Id. at 384-85, 668 P.2d at 678-79, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 371-72, quoting Flood v. Kuhn,
316 F. Supp. 271, aff'd, 443 F.2d 264, aff'd, 352 U.S. 445 (1972).
170. Id at 385, 668 P.2d at 678-79, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
171. Raiders IV 174 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. Trial Brief of Plaintiff at 13, supra note 50.
175. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
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precedent allowed a city to condemn that franchise.176 However, it is not
necessarily true that all cities with sports franchises would suddenly con-
demn them. Many unmentioned factors, such as the potentially high
cost of paying the fifth amendment's required just compensation, are
likely to prevent most cities from condemning teams. All the Raiders IV
court accomplished by this decision was the creation of bad law. As un-
savory as the idea of condemning a NFL franchise may seem to some
people, condemnation is not a violation of the commerce clause.
E. An Alternative to the Dormant Commerce Clause Defense
Most significant to the present case is the structure of the California
statutes regarding eminent domain. California's eminent domain law is
intentionally broad to encompass all types of property. California Gov-
ernment Code section 37350.5 provides that "[a] city may acquire by
eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of its powers
and functions."' 77 Property, in turn, is defined as "real and personal
property and any interest therein." '178 This definition purposely encom-
passes the "broadest possible definition of property and includes any type
of right, title, or interest in property that may be required for public
use."' 7 9 Certainly, the broad scope of these provisions could include the
Raiders' NFL franchise. Moreover, any contractual right or obligation
could likewise be considered property under these same provisions.180 It
may also be argued that Oakland had the power to condemn the Raiders'
franchise as property under California Government Code section 37350.5
to carry out its municipal powers and functions.
Assuming these arguments are correct, two questions are then
raised: (1) is owning and operating a professional football team, specifi-
cally the Raiders, a public use, and (2) assuming that owning the Raiders
is a public use, is owning and operating a football team necessary for
Oakland to carry out its powers and functions?
1. Is Team Ownership a Public Use?
In California, the power of eminent domain may only be used to
acquire property for public use.' 18  However, few California courts, and
176. Trial Brief of Plaintiff at 13, supra note 50.
177. CAL. Gov. CODE § 37350.5 (Deering 1988) (emphasis added).
178. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.170 (Deering 1988).
179. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, EMINENT DOMAIN LAW, official com-
ment to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.170, at 1076 (C.E.B. 1975).
180. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
181. Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 69, 646 P.2d at 840-41, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79; Cf CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010 (Deering 1988).
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even fewer federal courts, have overruled a legislative determination of
"public use."'8 2 For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,183
the United States Supreme Court, after articulating nearly one hundred
years of judicial restraint in reviewing the various state and federal legis-
lative determinations of public use, effectively read the "public use"
clause out of the United States Constitution. 84 It is hard to imagine any
legislative action which could not be of "conceivable" public utility. The
condemnation of a football team arguably would benefit Oakland
"recreationally, socially, economically and psychologically."'' 8 5  These
benefits accruing to Oakland's citizens support the condemnation as a
conceivably legitimate public use.
Like public use, the necessity of a particular condemnation project is
subject to great legislative deference, 8 6 so long as the condemnor is in
compliance with proper procedures. 8 7 However, Oakland did not com-
182. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010 ("Where the Legislature provides by statute that a
use... is one for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised, such action is deemed
to be a declaration ... that such use... is a public use."); Raiders I, 32 Cal. 3d at 78, 646 P.2d
at 846, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 684-85 (Bird, C.J., concurring), quoting Consolidated Channel Co. v.
C.P.R.R. Co., 51 Cal. 269, 273 (1876) ("Without doubt it is the general rule that where there is
any doubt whether the use to which the property is proposed to be devoted is of a public or
private character, it is a matter to be determined by the Legislature [sic] and the courts will not
undertake to disturb its judgment in this regard."); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893) ("The legislature may determine what private property is
needed for public purposes-that is a question of a politicial and legislative character .... ");
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("The role of the judiciary in determining whether
the power [of eminent domain] is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one.").
183. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
184. Id at 241. "But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be pro-
scribed by the Public Use Clause." Id.
185. Trial Brief of Plaintiff at 13, supra note 50.
186. See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1922) (United States Supreme
Court deferring to the resolution of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, as a matter
of state law, that condemnation of a highway through Rindge's property was necessary for
public use); but see Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Norm's Slauson, 173 Cal.
App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985) (Resolution of necessity, although usually conclusive
on issue of existence of three requirements that 1) the property is necessary for public use, 2)
the project is necessary for public purpose and 3) taking the particular property is compatible
with the greatest public good at the least private injury, nevertheless is reviewable if influenced
by an abuse of legislative discretion.); Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (Deering 1988).
187. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1240.040 provides that a resolution of necessity, complying
with the requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1245.210 must be adopted by a public entity
before an action in eminent domain is instituted. This resolution cannot be adopted without
prior notification and a "reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard before the governing
body considering the resolution at a public hearing." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(a)
(Deering 1988). Subsection (b)(3) of § 1245.235 implies that a 15 day period must be allowed
for the condemnee to give written notice of its intention to appear at the public hearing. After
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
ply with proper condemnation procedures.Is' Oakland filed its condem-
nation action before adopting a resolution of necessity. ' 9 Concurrently,
Oakland applied for and received a temporary restraining order enjoining
the Raiders from moving to Los Angeles. 9° A resolution of necessity
was adopted by the Oakland City Council four days later.' 9' Finally, on
March 11, 1980, the Oakland City Council afforded the Raiders an op-
portunity to be heard on the "proposed" condemnation.' 92 However, by
that time, the condemnation action was pending. Not surprisingly, the
resolution of necessity was reaffirmed. ' 9a The procedural defect outlined
above was brought to the court's attention five times in this litigation as a
bar to the condemnation action.' 94 Each time the argument was summa-
rily rejected. 95 This determination rendered Raiders I the law of the
case, ending all discussion of the Raiders' defenses that the Oakland City
this public hearing is held, the resolution of necessity may be adopted by a two-thirds vote of
the governing body. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.240 (Deering 1988). Once adopted, the
resolution "conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030." Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 1245.250(a); "A valid resolution precludes judicial review . . . of the matters
specified in Section 1240.030...." CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, EMINENT DO-
MAIN LAW, comment to § 1245.250, at 1129 (C.E.B. 1975); Norm's Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
188. Raiders III, 150 Cal. App. 3d 267, 276-78, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729, 734-36.
189. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1240.030 requires that the legislature adopt a resolution that
particular property is required to promote the legitimate goals of a particular project for public
use. Thus, before an eminent domain action may be filed, a resolution of necessity must be
adopted by the authorized condemning authority.
190. Raiders I1, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 276-77, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735. This premature filing
was apparently motivated by the city fathers' fears that the Raiders would move beyond the
territorial limits of Oakland's eminent domain power before a resolution of necessity could be
obtained. Oakland filed the condemnation action on February 11, 1980, the day after a United
States District Court restrained the NFL from preventing the Raiders' move to Los Angeles.
Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 15, supra note 50. After that order, Oakland had no guarantee that
the Raiders would remain in Oakland. Thus, the premature condemnation action was
necessary.
191. Raiders II 150 Cal. App. 3d at 277, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. "This challenge was twice made.., before summary judgment was entered." Id The
summary judgment was reversed in Raiders L In that proceeding, the Raiders again brought
up the procedural defects. Despite the argument's legitimacy, the California Supreme Court
ignored the issue. Moreover, the issue was raised again in the Raiders' petition for the rehear-
ing of Raiders I which was denied. Raiders , 32 Cal. 3d at 79, 646 P.2d at 846-47, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 685. Thus, the court of appeal in Raiders III determined the issue was essentially
moot. Raiders II, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 278, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
195. The Raiders III court summarized the issue succinctly by stating that "the procedural
bar was necessarily determined adversely to the Raiders in Raiders I; otherwise the Supreme
Court could not have reversed the judgment and remanded for trial." Raiders II 150 Cal.
App. 3d at 278, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735. Since the procedural defect would have been an abso-
lute bar to the taking, the court necessarily decided the point in favor of Oakland, albeit the
decision was implied. Id at 277-78, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
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Council abused its discretion in finding that condemning the franchise
constituted a legitimate public use, and that the resolution of necessity
required to condemn was defective.
2. Is Team Ownership Necessary for Oakland to Carry Out its
Powers and Functions as a Municipality?
The law establishing the general principle that if the legislature finds
a condemnation project is a public use, then no court may question that
determination, does not answer the obvious question of whether a foot-
ball team is necessary for a city to carry out its powers and functions. 1
96
Of the myriad of cities and municipalities throughout the United States,
only twenty eight have professional football teams. Further, the cities
with the NFL franchises have experienced the greatest economic trouble
in recent years. 197 Oakland remains a functioning municipality, nearly
eight years after the Raiders left the city, despite the continuing financial
burden of the Coliseum, built primarily on the expectation of the Raid-
ers' continued presence in the city. Obviously, all of a city's economic
problems cannot be blamed on a football team's presence, or the lack
thereof; a football team alone probably cannot generate enough revenue
to keep a city thriving. Many cities have no local football team, yet they
are able to carry out their powers and functions without condemning
one.'98 Therefore, a professional football team is not necessary for a mu-
nicipal corporation or public entity to function.
V. CONCLUSION
The result of this endless cycle of litigation is not crystal clear. For
196. CAL. Gov. CODE § 37350.5 (Deering 1988).
197. Cities such as New York (Jets and Giants), Cleveland (Browns), Detroit (Lions), Pitts-
burgh (Steelers), Green Bay (Packers), Baltimore (Colts) and Dallas (Cowboys) have all suf-
fered financial setbacks, including bankruptcy for some, in recent years.
198. Although this discussion is to some degree conjecture, it is not without merit. Rhetori-
cally, has any one heard of a city collapsing for the very reason that it did not have a football
team? Or more specifically, has Oakland been unable to exercise its powers and functions since
the Raiders moved to Los Angeles? Or, has Baltimore failed in its civic powers and functions
since the Colts made their exit? The answer to all these questions is, of course, "No." It may
be unfair to make such a literal reading of CAL. Gov. CODE § 37350.5, but it is no less accu-
rate than justifying condemnation of a football franchise by analogy to a city's right to con-
demn real property for use as a sports stadium. See Raiders 1, 32 Cal. 3d at 70-73, 646 P.2d at
841-43, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 679-82 and cited authorities. Although this discussion leads well
beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that for reasons such as contractual negotiabil-
ity, manageability of personnel acquisition, personnel trading, player incentive, bureaucratic
red-tape, and municipal regulations on issues of fund expenditures, a public policy should be
established that a professional sports franchise should not be owned and operated by a munici-
pal corporation.
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the reasons stated above, the dormant commerce clause is not likely to be
a successful defense to any future condemnation, unless the subject prop-
erty is a professional sports franchise. Therefore, such condemnations
are unlikely to occur in the future. Raiders IV offers no insight indicat-
ing how a sports franchise may be condemned. The case says that con-
demning a sports franchise violates the Constitution. Raiders IV,
therefore, leads only to one legally unsupportable conclusion: the power
of eminent domain is subject to another limitation in addition to the re-
quirement of just compensation-the dormant commerce clause.
Leon F. Mead, 11
